Mind the Gap:
Can Developers of Autonomous
Weapons Systems be Liable for War
Crimes?
Tim McFarland and Tim McCormack
90 INT’L L. STUD. 361 (2014)

Volume 90

2014

Mind the Gap

Vol. 90

Mind the Gap:
Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons
Systems be Liable for War Crimes?
Tim McFarland
Tim McCormack**

I. ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS IN RELATION TO AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
SYSTEMS

F
I

ew aspects of the emergence of autonomous weapons systems
engender divergence of opinion as dramatically as questions of
 Tim McFarland BE (Hons), BEc, JD, is a PhD candidate at the Melbourne Law
School and a member of the Research Team on Emerging Technologies of Warfare and
Challenges to the Law of Armed Conflict at the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law. His
PhD is focused on the legal implications of developing and deploying autonomous
weapons systems.
**
Tim McCormack is a Professor of Law at the Melbourne Law School and an
Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Tasmania Law School. He is also Special
Adviser on International Humanitarian Law to the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, although this article is written in his personal capacity and should not be
read as reflective of the position of the Prosecutor. Professor McCormack leads the
Research Team on the Australian Research Council-funded project Emerging
Technologies of Warfare and Challenges to the Law of Armed Conflict.
The authors wish to thank Professor Marco Sassóli for drawing our attention to the
specific issue of the actions of developers occurring before the commencement of an
armed conflict. We also thank Group Captain Ian Henderson, Associate Professor Robert
Mathews, Dr. Rain Liivoja, Ms. Kobi Leins and Ms. Natalia Jevglevskaja for insightful
comments on earlier drafts and Ms. Madeleine Summers for her helpful research
assistance.
361

International Law Studies

2014

accountability for violations of the law of armed conflict. One extreme is
simplistically summarized as “the sky is falling.” Technological advances
represent an epochal challenge to the existing legal framework because
human decision making, and the concomitant responsibility which ensues,
has never previously been removed or distanced from control of the
weapons system in quite the same way as is now contemplated with
autonomous weapons systems. The decision to deploy an autonomous
weapons system is now not predicated on the ongoing exercise of human
oversight over the system; control over the behavior of the weapons
system in military operations will have been exercised much earlier in the
programming of the system.1
The other extreme is that “there is nothing new under the sun.”
Machines of widely varying levels of technological sophistication, many of
them far too complex for a non-specialist to understand in detail, have
been wielded in combat for millennia and rarely has there been much
difficulty in applying existing principles of law to their use. The law is
adaptable and capable of regulation of the current and foreseeable future
generations of autonomous weapons systems. There may well be new
aspects here that will require particular amendment, revision and
adaptation, but there is no wholesale existential threat to the existing law of
armed conflict.
Intriguingly, even these two extremes (and presumably variations of
them along a spectrum) share substantial common ground in
acknowledging the fundamental importance of accountability to the
efficacy of the law of armed conflict. That commonality is important and
is the starting point for our analysis. In the development of new weapons
technology, lawyers and policymakers are obliged to ensure that
compliance with the law will be maintained2 and that those who seriously
violate the law are held accountable.3
1. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER
ROBOTS (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity.
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36(2), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
3. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
the Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[hereinafter GC I];
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter GC II]; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Convention (IV) Relative to the
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Our intention in this article is not to attempt an exhaustive and
definitive analysis of accountability issues arising from war crimes
perpetrated via autonomous weapons systems. Instead, our hope here is to
provoke more detailed analysis and discussion. Our aim is to explore some
of the complexities in the application of the existing accountability
framework likely to result from the deployment of increasingly advanced
autonomous weapons systems.
Here we focus on the particular issue of accountability for developers
of autonomous weapon systems. Development of any modern weapon is a
complex undertaking; large teams of people and organizations are involved
at all stages of the process, from creation of the concept, through the
various stages of development (with extensive interaction between military
decision makers providing specifications, producers responding to those
specifications, and those responsible for testing and approval for
production) to production and ultimately deployment. “Developers,” for
the purposes of this article, refer broadly to people who play some
significant role in defining the behavior of an autonomous weapons
system, as opposed to “operators,” which refer to those responsible for
utilizing the system in some situation during armed conflict. We are not
suggesting here that operators cannot be accountable for deploying or
activating an autonomous weapons system, including for actions such as
inputting certain data (for example, those targets currently approved for
attack) or for employing the system outside of its designed operating
parameters. Our focus here, though, is on the specific issue of the
accountability of the developers of autonomous weapons systems because
accountability concerns so often focus on this particular category of
involved personnel.
Effective implementation of individual criminal liability for violations
of the law of armed conflict is fundamental to ensuring respect for the law.
In the absence of effective enforcement, impunity flourishes and the
normative status of the law is undermined. The key concept was first
explicitly articulated in the grave breaches regime common to all four
Geneva Conventions of 1949.4 States parties to the Conventions are
obliged to criminalize the specific breaches identified as “grave” and to
investigate and either prosecute or extradite for trial those allegedly
responsible for perpetration of any of the grave breaches.
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GC IV]; Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art 85(1).
4. GC I, art. 50; GC II, art. 51; GC III, art. 130; GC IV, art. 147, all supra note 3.
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Explicit obligations for criminalization of serious violations of the law
of armed conflict were novel in 1949, although the concept of individual
criminal responsibility for serious violations was not. In the aftermath of
the First World War, the Allied Commission on Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties enumerated a list of
offenses for further investigation and subsequent prosecution despite the
lack of explicit criminalization of serious violations of the law of armed
conflict in any of the relevant treaties.5 The proposed Allied High
Tribunals for the prosecution of defendants from the defeated Central
Powers failed to eventuate, but not because of any principled objection to
the notion of individual criminal responsibility.6 The Geneva Conventions
of 1949, in contrast, were negotiated in the immediate aftermath of the
conclusion of the Nuremberg (1945–46) and Tokyo (1946–48) trials and it
is hardly surprising that the breakthrough grave breaches regime reflects
the post-Second World War commitment to individual criminal
responsibility—at least for defeated Axis Power accused.
Additional Protocol I takes the notion of individual responsibility for
violations of the law a step further by explicitly identifying the preeminence of military commanders in ensuring compliance with the law.
Commanders who order their subordinates to perpetrate atrocities in
violation of the law are, of course, liable for the ensuing crimes.7 But
military commanders who fail to exercise their authority to stop crimes
occurring, or who fail to punish their responsible subordinates if crimes
have already occurred, are also liable for such crimes. Articles 86 and 87 of
Additional Protocol I explicitly impose an international legal obligation on
parties to an armed conflict to require commanders to take all necessary
measures to prevent crimes being committed and to initiate disciplinary or
penal sanctions when crimes have been perpetrated.8 These provisions are

5. Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), reprinted in 14
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 114–15 (1920).
6. For more detail on the proposed Allied High Tribunals, see GARY J. BASS, STAY
THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000); Tim
McCormack, Their Atrocities and Our Misdemeanours: The Reticence to Try a State’s ‘Own
Nationals’ for International Crimes, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 107 (Mark
Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, recognizes this mode of criminal liability.
8. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, arts. 86, 87.
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recognized as customary international law9 and are reflected, for example,
in Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute.
The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I articulates the rationale
for the imposition of an explicit international legal duty on military
commanders:
In fact the role of commanders is decisive. Whether they are concerned
with the theatre of military operations, occupied territories or places of
internment, the necessary measures for the proper application of the
Conventions and the Protocol must be taken at the level of the troops, so
that a fatal gap between the undertakings entered into by Parties to the conflict and the
conduct of individuals is avoided. At this level, everything depends on
commanders, and without their conscientious supervision, general legal
requirements are unlikely to be effective.10

The drafters of the Protocol recognized that commanders, through the
control they exercise over subordinates, have the means to ensure
adherence to the law by maintaining discipline, being informed about the
conduct of their forces and taking action to prevent or punish breaches.11
So important is the role of the commander in the law of armed conflict,
that the commentaries describe the ever-present potential for a “fatal gap”
between international legal obligations on one hand and the perpetration of
egregious violations of the law on the other. Military commanders have the
ability to stop atrocities occurring, or at least to sanction those subordinates
who commit them in order to deter others from violations of the law in the
future. Those commanders who choose not to act, or choose not to utilize
the authority they have to intervene and to prevent crimes from being
committed, are to be held criminally responsible for the crimes they could
have prevented and/or should have punished.
But all of this—individual criminal responsibility for those who violate
the law and for those commanders who fail to exercise the authority they
possess to prevent or to punish their subordinates responsible for
violations of the law—is predicated on the notion, immortalized in the
words of the Nuremberg judges, that “crimes . . . are committed by men,
9. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 153, 558–63 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
10. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 3550 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
11. Id., ¶ 3560.
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not by abstract entities.”12 In 1946 when the Nuremberg judgment was
handed down, the abstract entity in question was the State—specifically the
Third Reich—and the judges were making the point that collective policy
decisions and their implementation are reducible to the acts and
intent/knowledge of the individual human beings that make up the abstract
collective entity. Enforcement of the law of armed conflict is dependent
upon identification of those responsible for the serious violations that have
occurred.
We are not suggesting that there is anything abstract about a robot, but
the judges’ words apply equally well: a weapons system, regardless of its
level of sophistication, is an inanimate object; its existence and its capacity
to cause harm result from the efforts of weapon developers, just as with a
rifle or a missile. Unlike developers of rifles and missiles though,
developers of highly autonomous weapons systems will play a role arguably
not entirely consistent with the current legal framework. As explained in
more detail in Section II, a highly autonomous weapons system has the
potential to partly or fully displace combat personnel from the roles they
have traditionally occupied, so that accountability for proscribed acts
committed via such systems may not be easily ascribed to those personnel
or to their commanders. Rather, developers will exert greater control over
not only the range of actions the weapons system is capable of performing,
but over the specific actions that it in fact performs after being deployed.
Accordingly, the question of developer accountability becomes pertinent.
Before considering the legal significance of machine autonomy, it is
perhaps worth revisiting the early observation about divergence of opinion
in relation to accountability for serious violations of the law perpetrated via
autonomous weapons systems. That divergence may be at least partially
explicable in terms of interpretation versus application of existing law.
Proponents of the “nothing new under the sun” perspective would
presumably claim that since technological advances have not resulted in a
level of autonomy that replaces human control, the existing legal
framework is just as adequate as it is for any existing weapons system. In
contrast, proponents of “the sky is falling” perspective might argue that
even with existing relatively rudimentary levels of automation (including
remote-controlled unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), for
example) the current legal framework is not effectively applied, and if
12. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947).
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accountability is lacking for such systems, how much less effective will it be
for significantly more sophisticated levels of autonomy.
Some authors have approached this topic by suggesting that where a
machine operates with a degree of independence from human oversight
sufficient to raise serious questions about accountability, the machine
could, perhaps, be granted legal personality and could itself be held
accountable for violations of the law.13 This article takes the view that the
level of technological and social development needed to justify talking
about the legal personality of machines is far in the future and is not yet—
and may never be—a practical consideration. That does not mean that
identifying the potential future issue and discussing the legal ramifications
is not a worthwhile endeavor, but this article is not an appropriate forum
for engaging with that particular question.
II.

THE ROLE OF DEVELOPERS IN RELATION TO AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS SYSTEMS

We understand autonomous weapons systems to be those with some
significant capacity to manage their own operation. Specific configurations
of such systems vary widely, and are likely to vary much more widely in the
future, but for legal analytical purposes all such systems can be viewed as
being comprised of a few high-level subsystems. The weapon itself, such as
a gun or a missile, is only one of those subsystems and is not necessarily of
central interest when addressing questions of accountability as the novel
issues relate more to how the weapon is controlled. Similarly, one or more
sensor subsystems would normally be employed, such as cameras or radar,
to obtain environmental information. Of primary interest though is the
autonomous weapon’s control system, essentially a special-purpose
computer, which manages the weapon, sensors and other subsystems. The
control system’s task is to receive commands or goals from an external
entity (human, or perhaps another autonomous system), as well as
environmental information via sensor systems, and then operate the
weapon accordingly. At the heart of the control system, and of novel
questions about legal accountability, is software written by weapon
developers.

13. See, e.g., John Sullins, When is a Robot a Moral Agent?, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
23 (2006).

OF INFORMATION ETHICS
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The capacity of such software to manage the operation of a weapons
system without waiting for an explicit input from a human operator at
every step is the basis of many of the anticipated operational advantages
driving development of these advanced systems.14 The speed and accuracy
of computation in modern computer systems will enable autonomous
weapons to function in situations where a human operator is incapable of
making timely decisions, such as where the tempo of battle is too fast15 or
the amount of data to be processed is too great. Enabling vehicles and
weapon installations to function without crews greatly reduces the potential
for casualties among the armed force operating them. Significant cost
savings can be realized by reducing the number of human soldiers to be
paid, transported and for which care must be provided.
The capacity for self-managed operation is also the basis of the novel
legal effects of deploying autonomous weapons systems; in particular,
those effects relating to accountability for violations of the law of armed
conflict. Essentially, autonomous capability in a weapons system alters the
relationship between the soldier, the traditional bearer of legal
responsibilities, and their weapon, the means by which those
responsibilities are fulfilled. If, for example, a soldier aims a “dumb”
weapon such as a rifle at a civilian and pulls the trigger, it is not contentious
to say that the soldier performs that proscribed act. A separate, specific
decision and action by the soldier is required for each separate activation of
the rifle and there is no intervening event which may interfere with
identification of that soldier as perpetrator of that action. When the rifle is
replaced with an autonomous weapons system though, the weapon’s
control system “steps into the shoes” of an operator to some significant
extent, reducing the need—and opportunity—for human intervention and
placing the weapon developer somewhat “between” the soldier and
activation of the weapon. This is the essential legal distinction between
systems with a significant capacity for autonomous operation and other
complex weapons systems: autonomy extends to instigation of an action,
not just performance. To some extent, an autonomous machine replicates
14. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 126–34, 229–36 (2009); Robert Sparrow,
Robotic Weapons and the Future of War, in NEW WARS AND NEW SOLDIERS: MILITARY
ETHICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 117 (Jessica Wolfendale & Paolo Tripodi eds.,
2011); Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12
COLUMBIA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW 272, 275 (2011).
15. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 62, 68
(2007).
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the mental (decision-making) processes leading to an act rather than just
the physical processes involved in its commission.
That is not to say that autonomous weapons should be treated as
systems that will operate without any real-time human interaction or
oversight. The degree to which human actors may be removed from
positions of direct control is likely to vary in complex ways. Machine
autonomy is a capability that exists within a continuum rather than at
discrete levels, ranging from complete human control over some
operations to complete computer control. Military and civilian research
organizations have proposed many different taxonomies of autonomous
capability.16 Relevantly, these taxonomies invariably anticipate some degree
of shared control, where either a human or the computer may initiate a task
and the human operator may or may not be in a position to approve or
override an operation initiated by the computer. Further, the capacity for
autonomous operation will generally be specific to particular subsystems of
a weapons system, such as navigation (in the case of a vehicle), target
identification and weapon release. There is no reason to suppose that all
operations of an autonomous system will be subject to the same degree of
human oversight, and a system may be operating at several different levels
of autonomy simultaneously with respect to different tasks. For example, a
weapons system may autonomously identify and track potential targets but
require a human operator to manually operate the weapon. This
consideration also applies to a “system of systems” scenario wherein
nominally separate systems with different levels of autonomy, such as an
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system and a weapons
system, communicate directly. Finally, the degree of direct human control
over a weapons system may vary with mission phases and according to
unexpected circumstances that arise during a mission, with either the
system or the operator instigating the revision.17
Despite the complexities of determining whether and to what extent a
human operator may be in a position to exercise control over a particular
action of an autonomous system, it is envisaged that generally the higher
the level of autonomous operation exhibited by a weapons system, the less
16. Peter A. Hancock & Stephen F. Scallen, Allocating Functions in Human–Machine
Systems, in VIEWING PSYCHOLOGY AS A WHOLE: THE INTEGRATIVE SCIENCE OF WILLIAM
N. DEMBER 509, 521 (Robert R. Hoffman, Michael F. Sherrick & Joel S. Warm eds.,
1998).
17. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 27 (July 2012).
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control will be exercised by a human operator in the field and the more
control will be exercised by developers of the control software (that has
reduced the level of control over the weapons system exercised by that
human operator).
If the level of autonomous operation can vary from complete human
control through various degrees and types of shared control to complete
computer control, it is necessary to ask: in what circumstances, if any, does
a system’s inbuilt capacity for autonomous operation start to affect the
allocation of criminal responsibility for serious violations of the law of
armed conflict? It is suggested that there are two indications that such a
point has been reached. The first is that the system’s autonomous
operation relates to a decision and action that is the subject of legal
regulation. The canonical example of this would be discharging a weapon,
but other acts such as crossing an international border may also be
significant. The second indication is that the degree of control over the
regulated action exercised by the system itself—and by extension by its
developers—has increased to the point where it is not reasonable to say
that a human operator alone exercises effective control; that is, the
individual who would normally decide to “pull the trigger” is no longer
solely responsible for that decision. At that point, some part of the
effective human control over the behavior of the weapons system is builtin to the system during development rather than after deployment or at the
time of the actual use of force. It would generally be the case that such
development would occur prior to commencement of an armed conflict in
which the weapons system is deployed.
The next question then is whether these circumstances have yet arisen,
or are within the scope of development plans that have so far been made
public. Weapons systems in use today generally exhibit capabilities for
autonomous operation far below what would be required to raise serious
questions about accountability, although many of the component
technologies which may one day comprise a highly autonomous weapons
system either exist already or are under development. UCAVs18 employed
in strikes in the Middle East and Africa may have some capacity to
autonomously perform low-level piloting tasks such as flight path
stabilization,19 but legally significant actions, including firing a weapon,
18. See, e.g., Predator UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL, http://www.gaasi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php (last visited May 14, 2014).
19. See, e.g., Autonomous Flight for Flight Platforms, U.S. Patent No. 7809480 B2
(filed Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://www.google.com/patents/US7809480.
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require an instruction to be issued by an operator who is actively
monitoring the UCAV. Defensive systems such as the Patriot missile
system20 and the family of close-in weapons systems (CIWS), including the
well-known Phalanx CIWS21 mounted on naval vessels deployed by various
States, arguably go further in automating part or all of the targeting and
firing process, but that process operates only in very specific and
unambiguous circumstances.
Development plans that have been made public by various research
and military organizations still focus on fielding “unmanned” rather than
“autonomous” systems for the near future, but they indicate that the range
of tasks assigned to both such systems is likely to expand greatly over the
coming years. Basic research being conducted by universities, commercial
organizations and organizations such as the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) focuses more strongly on machine autonomy
though, as do the long-term plans of various armed forces. Plans made
public by the U.S. Air Force, for example, mention autonomous target
engagement as a long-term goal to be achieved sometime after 2025,22 and
other organizations have announced similar plans.23 Perhaps of more
immediate interest are plans to increase the level of autonomy in ISR
systems, such as DARPA’s Military Imaging and Surveillance Technology
program,24 which aims to develop ISR systems that will be able to perform
automated identification and recognition of potential targets. Given that
one of the major motivations for developing systems such as these is the
need to process the “unprecedented increase in intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance . . . data”25 which can overwhelm analysts working in
20. Patriot, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/patriot/
(last visited May 13, 2014).
21. Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/
capabilities/products/phalanx/ (last visited May 13, 2014).
22. Headquarter, U.S. Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Flight Plan
2009–2047 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf
[hereinafter UAS Flight Plan 2009–2047].
23. See, e.g., Army Capabilities Integration Center, Robotics Strategy White Paper
(2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496734.
24. Strategic Technology Office, Military Imaging and Surveillance Technology—Long Range
(MIST-LR) Phase 2, at 6, FEDBIZOPPS.GOV (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s
=opportunity&mode=form&id=78b0ddbf382678fa9ace985380108f89&tab=core&_cvie
w=0 (then DARPA-BAA-13-27_03.12.2013.docx hyperlink).
25. U.S. Department of Defense, Autonomy Research Pilot Initiative (ARPI): Invitation for
Proposals 4 (Nov. 2012), http://auvac.org/uploads/publication_pdf/Autonomy%20Resear
ch%20Pilot%20Initiative.pdf.
371

International Law Studies

2014

modern battlefields, the influence of autonomous systems on target
selection may be felt well in advance of the advent of systems which
remove humans from the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop26
altogether.
Although the timelines of these and other proposed developments are
uncertain, the direction appears to support concerns about how to address
possible violations of the law of armed conflict involving a highly
autonomous system. Machine autonomy is a matter of degree, and the
degree of autonomy needed to raise questions about the influence and
accountability of weapon developers may not be particularly high if one
considers the possibility of accessorial modes of liability (which are
discussed below). Provided that other threshold requirements for criminal
responsibility are met, a significant possibility exists that weapon
developers may exercise a sufficient degree of control over proscribed acts
by the systems they create such that they could be held liable for serious
violations of the law. The proviso that other threshold requirements are
met is important here. We turn now to consider some of the requisite
elements for criminal responsibility in the context of autonomous weapons
systems.
III.

CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPER ACCOUNTABILITY

Given the uncertainty inherent in attempting to forecast the development
paths of the relevant weapons technologies, the ways the weapons may be
used and the views which courts may adopt, it is difficult to say precisely
how the activities of developers may constitute acts proscribed by the law
of armed conflict. We can, however, identify some of the questions that
will arise and outline the most likely of the possible answers.
A.

Threshold Requirement of the Existence of an Armed Conflict

It is axiomatic that a war crime can only be perpetrated in the context of an
armed conflict. The application of the law of armed conflict is only
triggered when an armed conflict exists, so it follows ab initio that there
cannot be a serious violation of that law in the absence of the specific
context in which the law applies. In many war crimes trials, it is obvious
that the charges against the accused involved the perpetration of alleged
26. UAS Flight Plan 2009–2047, supra note 22, at 16.
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acts in the context of an armed conflict. In other trials, the prosecution has
a more challenging burden of establishing the existence of an armed
conflict. The canonical formulation of the threshold requirement,
repeatedly cited by international criminal courts and tribunals as well as in
national criminal trial proceedings, was articulated by the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
that Tribunal’s very first trial against Duško Tadić when it held that:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment,
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory
of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes
place there.27

The ICTY Appeals Chamber decision, reflecting both treaty and
customary international law, distinguished between international and noninternational armed conflicts and articulated a different threshold test for
these two types of armed conflict, with the latter having a significantly
higher threshold test.
Considerable effort is often expended in
international criminal trials to determine whether or not an armed conflict
exists and, if so, whether that armed conflict is international or noninternational. At least in the case of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor, if
s/he chooses to pursue charges of war crimes, must prove the existence
either of an international or of a non-international armed conflict as a
requisite threshold element.
For the purposes of our analysis, let us assume the following: (1) that
an armed conflict exists; (2) that it is immaterial whether that armed
conflict is international or non-international; and (3) that the weapons
developers completed their work before the armed conflict commenced.
27. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
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The critical issue arises from the third assumption and relates to the
satisfaction of the threshold contextual element of a war crime—the
existence of an armed conflict. It is possible that, in a protracted armed
conflict lasting many years, a weapons system may be developed and
deployed during the conduct of the armed conflict. Given the long lead
time for development of autonomous weapons systems, that scenario,
while possible (U.S. forces have already been deployed in Afghanistan for
nearly 13 years, for example), will be the exception rather than the norm.
In exceptional circumstances then, where all other threshold requirements
are met, it may well be that developers can be prosecuted for war crimes
because the threshold contextual element will be satisfied.
But what of the more likely scenario: where the development of the
system has concluded well before the armed conflict in which the weapons
system is deployed has commenced, such that the temporal distance of the
developers’ conduct from the context of armed conflict results in a serious
obstacle to individual criminal liability? For the purposes of our analysis
we will illustrate the issue by reference to the Rome Statute.
The Elements of Crimes document, negotiated to enumerate the
requisite elements for each substantive crime within the Rome Statute,
includes for every war crime a requirement that the alleged conduct “took
place in the context of and was associated with an [international or noninternational depending upon the precise provision of the Statute] armed
conflict.”28 It is difficult to imagine how the prosecution would prove that
element in relation to a weapons developer whose conduct preceded the
commencement of an armed conflict. Even if it were possible to argue
that the development of weapons systems is “associated with an armed
conflict” in the sense that the development has occurred in preparation for
deployment in an armed conflict when and if the need arises, the
development clearly will not have taken place “in the context of an armed
conflict.”
B.

Physical Perpetration and Accessorial Modes of Liability

In addition to proving all the constituent elements of a particular charge,
the prosecution must also prove the criminal liability of the accused by
reference to one or other of the enumerated grounds of individual criminal
28. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes art. 8 intro., U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (June 30, 2000).
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liability in Article 25 of the Rome Statute. In this respect, the nature of
development activities is significant and several observations can be made.
First, development means defining the behavior of a weapons system,
but stops short of activating the system on the battlefield (activation or
deployment is undertaken by the operator). Under this definition, even a
hypothetical developer with the requisite intent and a high degree of
control over a proscribed act committed via an autonomous system must
act through another person or organization. In itself, weapon development
can be no more than preparation for a proscribed physical act, not physical
performance of the act. It is therefore unlikely that developers of weapons
systems would be charged as physical perpetrators of war crimes pursuant
to Article 25(3)(a), unless the allegation was that the developer exercised
sufficient control to commit the crime “through another person, regardless
of whether that other person is criminally responsible”; the other person
being the operator that deployed the already developed weapons system
years after the system had been developed.
Another hypothetical scenario, as applicable to conventional weapons
and to weapons of mass destruction as it will be to autonomous weapon
systems, should also be mentioned. Where evidence exists of an explicit
common criminal purpose in which weapons developers intentionally
develop a weapon system for a known illegal purpose, the fact that certain
actions were undertaken prior to the commencement of an armed conflict
in which the weapon was subsequently deployed and the intended crimes
perpetrated will not preclude prosecution of the developers’ conduct. Such
scenarios will, hopefully, be rare—exceptions rather than the norm—but
the international community has witnessed ruthless political regimes willing
to utilize all the resources available to them, including the co-opting of
scientific and technical expertise, to produce a capability which they have
not hesitated to use, including against their own civilian populations. The
doctrine of common criminal purpose as a mode of individual criminal
liability clearly envisages acts of preparation to contribute to or to further
an agreed criminal activity or criminal purpose.29
Second, to the extent that weapon developers may be said to instigate
or control some action of an autonomous weapons system, they do so
through the control software and other subsystems that they design, and
the degree of control exercised by a developer depends on the degree of
autonomy exhibited by the weapons system in respect of an action. Insofar
29. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 25(3)(d).
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as it shapes the relationship between operators and weapons systems and
excludes operators from intervening to exercise direct physical control over
proscribed acts, the degree of system autonomy would also determine the
potential for developers to be held accountable for actions instigated by
those systems and is the likely mode for finding liability.
As explained above, as the degree of autonomy exhibited by a system
increases, operators and developers move through various forms of shared
control of—and responsibility for—the behavior of the system. As long as
an operator remains “in the loop” or “on the loop,” and thus able to
intervene in the functioning of the weapons system, control is shared
between developer and operator. At some point yet to be defined it may be
that system developers could occupy a position of effective control over
the actions taken by a system in some situation encountered during a
conflict, such that soldiers and their commanders may be effectively
excluded and cannot be reasonably said to instigate those actions or be in a
position to intervene. It therefore seems necessary to examine two modes
of liability: where a developer via an autonomous system’s control software
plays some contributory, but not decisive, role in instigating and carrying
out a course of action, and where the system exercises such control that
soldiers in the field cannot be said to have meaningfully contributed.
Perhaps the most likely and appropriate alleged ground of liability where
any degree of shared control is present would be pursuant to Article
25(3)(c) as an accessory who “aids, abets or otherwise assists in [the]
commission [of the crime] . . . including providing the means for its
commission.”
C.

International Jurisprudence on Ex Ante Aiding and Abetting

Both alternative grounds of criminal liability would require the conduct
constituting the crime to have been completed in the context of and be
associated with an armed conflict. In relation to the deployment of an
autonomous weapon system that results in a serious violation of the law in
an armed conflict context, the “completion” of the requisite conduct is
readily imaginable. The critical question is whether acts of preparation,
which are to be completed either subsequently through the agency of
another person or are to aid, abet or otherwise assist in the commission of
the crime (including providing the means for its commission), can occur
prior to the existence of an armed conflict.
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We are unable to identify any extant jurisprudence from international
war crimes trials to support the notion of individual criminal liability for
war crimes where an accused’s acts have occurred prior to the
commencement of an armed conflict. At best, there are broad general
statements as to hypothetical possibilities of accessorial liability for acts
committed prior to the principal offense. By way of obiter dicta, the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY in the Blaškić judgment affirmed the possibility that:
“[T]he actus reus of aiding and abetting a crime may occur before, during, or
after the principal crime has been perpetrated, and that the location at
which the actus reus takes place may be removed from the location of the
principal crime.”30
The Appeals Chamber countenanced the possibility that acts
constituting aiding and abetting may occur before the principal crime has
occurred, but that is a broad statement of principle and one not tested by
the facts in the Blaškić trial. Both at the trial stage and on appeal, it was
decided that aiding and abetting was not the appropriate ground of criminal
liability for the charges against Blaškić and, for our purposes, the nature of
the allegations against the accused certainly did not involve acts of
preparation prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Lašva Valley region of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the
judgment against Charles Taylor affirmed the general statement of principle
on aiding and abetting articulated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Blaškić:
The Accused may aid and abet at one or more of the “planning,
preparation or execution” stages of the crime or underlying offence. The
lending of practical assistance, encouragement or moral support may
occur before, during or after the crime or underlying offence occurs. The
actus reus of aiding and abetting does not require “specific direction.” No
evidence of a plan or agreement between the aider and abettor and the
perpetrator is required, except in cases of ex post facto aiding and abetting
where “at the time of planning or execution of the crime, a prior
agreement exists between the principal and the person who subsequently
aids and abets the principal.”31

30. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) [hereinafter Blaškić Appeal].
31. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 484 (May 18,
2012) [hereinafter Taylor].
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Here again, the judges countenanced the possibility of ex ante acts
constituting aiding and abetting but, in Taylor, unlike in Blaškić, the accused
was convicted on the basis of this ground of individual criminal liability.
However, in contrast to the scenario of a weapons developer completing all
acts prior to the commencement of an armed conflict, Charles Taylor was
found to have aided and abetted offenses throughout the indictment period
and while the armed conflict raged within Sierra Leone. In particular, the
Trial Chamber found that Taylor’s steady supply of arms, ammunition,
soldiers, operational support, encouragement and moral support to the
RUF/AFRC forces throughout the indictment period all constituted
substantial contributions to the commission of the alleged crimes.32
In the absence of jurisprudence considering actual ex ante conduct, it is
speculative to anticipate the hypothetical determinations of a court. But
given: (1) the formulation in the Rome Statute’s Elements of Crimes of the
requisite contextual existence of an armed conflict for all war crimes; and
(2) Article 22(2) of the Statute which requires that “the definition of a
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy” and
that “in case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted,” any chamber of
the International Criminal Court asked to decide the question in the future
is likely to read the requisite elements narrowly.
D.

Mens Rea Requirements

This section focuses on the mens rea requirements of the most plausible
ground of developer liability discussed above—aiding and abetting. As was
seen in relation to the physical element of the offense, the ex ante nature of
developers’ activities is also likely to present a significant barrier to
establishing the mental element required for criminal responsibility.
Article 30 of the Rome Statute represents the first general attempt to
codify the rules relating to the mental element of crimes in international
criminal law. Relevantly, the first paragraph of that Article states that
“[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only
if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge,” on the
basis that intent exists when a person means to engage in conduct or cause

32. Id., ¶¶ 6907–58 (findings on aiding and abetting).
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a consequence, and knowledge refers to awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.
Some further guidance as to the limits of the knowledge required by
the aider and abettor may be gleaned from the judgment of the Trial
Chamber of the ICTY in the trial of Anto Furundžija, which noted that:
[I]t is not necessary that the aider and abettor should know the precise
crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If he is
aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and
one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the
commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.33

The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Blaškić judgment later concurred
with that statement,34 which seems to indicate that a developer need not be
a party to detailed and specific plans to employ an autonomous system in a
criminal act in order to be found guilty of aiding and abetting. That
condition would likely be readily satisfied by a competent developer who
imparts behavior to a weapons system which a reasonable person would be
expected to see as criminal in nature. However, there are two significant
challenges for prosecutors to overcome.
First, existing case law relates only to situations in which the accused is
found to be aware of a criminal intent which is held by the physical
perpetrator at the time that the accused engages in conduct which assists the
perpetrator. The members of Anto Furundžija’s anti-terrorist unit possessed
criminal intent and were committing criminal acts while Furundžija was
present and rendering assistance. Similarly Charles Taylor knew of a
criminal intent which had been formed (and acted on) by his soldiers at the
time he was providing supplies. Earlier, in the post-Second World War
Zyklon B case,35 in which the accused German industrialists were found
guilty of supplying poison gas used to exterminate allied nationals interned
in concentration camps in the knowledge that the gas was to be so used,
the intent of the SS officers who exterminated the internees had been
formed at the time the gas was supplied to them, and the industrialists who
supplied it were aware of that intent. There is no suggestion in the
33. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
34. Blaškić Appeal, supra note 30, ¶ 50.
35. The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, 1 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (1947) (British Military Court Hamburg, Germany).
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jurisprudence that the requisite mental state may extend to a developer’s
expectation that their work would be of assistance to a future perpetrator
who may later form a criminal intent which did not exist at the time the
developer completed their work.
Second, Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute also specifies a special
mental element which applies in relation to aiding and abetting. This is in
addition to the general requirements of Article 30 that a developer’s
conduct would need to be done “for the purpose of facilitating the
commission” of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Prosecutors
would be required to demonstrate that a weapon developer acts not only
with awareness of the eventual physical perpetrator’s intention to commit
the crime and with the knowledge that his or her conduct would assist in
perpetration of the offense,36 but also that s/he acts for the purpose of
facilitating the crime, rather than for the sole purpose of, for example,
selling weapons systems for profit37 or achieving another legal military
objective.
Equally formidable challenges would also face a prosecutor seeking to
show that a developer of a highly autonomous weapons system committed
a crime “through another person, regardless of whether that other person
is criminally responsible,” though the picture is less clear. Despite recent
signs of judicial opposition to the concept,38 the International Criminal
Court has generally favored the “control of the crime” approach to
adjudicating on commission through another person. If that approach is
adhered to, it would seem that a developer of a highly autonomous
weapons system could, with criminal intent, produce a weapons system
which performs a proscribed act without an instruction to that effect from
its operator. However, similar problems exist here as in relation to aiding
and abetting: the crime which the developer purportedly intends to
commit, or knows will be committed in the ordinary course of events, can
only occur later during an armed conflict. At a minimum, prosecutors
would need to demonstrate that the developer understood that the
weapons system would behave in an illegal manner, for example, to be
36. Taylor, supra note 31, ¶ 487.
37. ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH
WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
312 (2d ed., 2010).
38. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04–02/12,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Van den Wyngaert, J., concurring ¶¶ 4–30)
(Dec. 18, 2012).
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incapable of distinguishing between military personnel and civilians by
targeting and killing as yet unidentified civilian victims. Evidence of a
developer intentionally building in to the weapons system a mechanism for
targeting a specific individual known by the developer to be a civilian
immune from attack would, of course, satisfy the mens rea requirements, but
that type of evidence of specific intent will likely be rare.
E.

Attribution of Responsibility

This article has consistently referred to weapons developers as individuals
who may be held accountable for criminal acts committed via weapon
systems which they have created. In practice, of course, highly
sophisticated autonomous weapons systems would be—and are being—
developed by organizations and by groups of organizations. This is not
new. Complex weapons systems in use today are commonly comprised of
hundreds or thousands of subsystems constructed by large networks of
organizations: military and governmental bodies; domestic, foreign and
multinational corporations; academic institutions and so on. Attribution of
individual responsibility for a flaw, whether deliberate or accidental, would
likely be exceedingly difficult.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF AN ACCOUNTABILITY GAP FOR DEVELOPERS

At the outset, we identified two extreme views of an alleged accountability
gap between the law of armed conflict and those responsible for serious
violations of that law resulting from the deployment of autonomous
weapons systems. On one hand, some say there is not just a gap but a
yawning chasm “so unbridgeable, so deep and precarious” that the only
way to preserve the extant normative framework is to ban autonomous
weapons systems before they become any more sophisticated and the
international community loses any capacity for effective accountability. On
the other hand, some say that there is nothing to fear—that autonomous
weapons systems are not yet sufficiently sophisticated to pose a threat to
the efficacy of the normative framework and, in any case, that framework
has shown itself eminently capable of adaptation to new circumstances in
the past. That adaptability will manifest itself yet again when, and if, it
becomes necessary to revisit the application of current norms to new
weapons technologies generally and to autonomous weapons systems
specifically.
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As with many instances of polarized extremes, perhaps the truth lies
somewhere in the middle. We stated earlier that existing weapons systems
generally exhibit capabilities for autonomous operation far below what
would be required to raise serious questions about accountability. Those of
the “nothing new under the sun” perspective are likely to applaud this
observation as precisely the reason that the adaptability of the existing
normative framework is more than capable of regulating the increasing
deployment of autonomous weapons systems. Two responses are
important here.
First, limitations to the efficacy of the existing normative framework
are exposed by the increasing incidence of attacks from existing weapons
systems with relatively low levels of autonomy. For example, Philip
Alston, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Killings, is scathing in his assessment of the lack of
accountability in the dramatically increased CIA and U.S. Department of
Defense targeted killing programs. Alston writes of a “combination of
high levels of secrecy, combined with poor accountability” rendering it
“impossible to verify the extent to which applicable international standards
are respected in practice.”39 He argues that “none of the many existing
oversight mechanisms have been even minimally effective in relation to
targeted killings” and that the increasing use of drones and of special forces
to execute the targeted killings programs have “grave consequences for the
twin regimes of international human rights law . . . and international
humanitarian law . . . which aim to uphold the value of human life and
minimize the brutalities of warfare.”40
We have indicated earlier that legally significant actions in relation to
drones, such as the firing of a weapon, require an instruction to be issued
by an operator who is actively monitoring the drone. If accountability is so
ineffectual in relation to a level of automation which is legally insignificant,
what hope is there for robust accountability in respect of sophisticated
levels of automation? Of course, one response to Alston’s critique is that
the problem is not with the normative framework itself but with ineffectual
or improper implementation of it. The fact that deployment of weapons
systems with legally significant levels of autonomy may not be subject to
effective scrutiny and that serious violations of the law resulting from such
39. Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARVARD NATIONAL
SECURITY JOURNAL 283, 285 (2011), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
02/Vol.-2_Alston1.pdf.
40. Id. at 285, 287.
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deployment may not result in substantive accountability for those
responsible, does not render the weapons themselves illegal. However, the
critique remains and it is important to reflect on the implications of it for
the claim that the existing normative framework is more than capable of
adapting to the new challenges posed by autonomous weapons systems.
Second, while existing weapons systems are generally operating at the
lower end of the spectrum of autonomy, we have also observed that many
of the component technologies which will one day comprise a highly
autonomous weapons system either exist already or are currently under
development. Given the potential for legally significant levels of autonomy
in existing and/or developing technology, it seems naïve to simply dismiss
accountability dilemmas on the basis of “wait and see what happens.”41
We have attempted to identify and articulate what some of those dilemmas
are likely to be, at least in relation to the developers of weapons systems
with legally significant levels of autonomy.
The likely scenario that developers will complete their involvement in a
weapons system prior to the commencement of an armed conflict raises
real concerns about the satisfaction of various requisite elements of any
alleged war crime. We identified potential obstacles to developer liability
for war crimes. The first of these is the threshold requirement that the
alleged acts take place “in the context of an armed conflict.” That
particular threshold requirement may amount to giving de facto immunity
to weapons developers for subsequent war crimes. A prosecutor may seek
to argue that the culmination of acts perpetrated prior to the
commencement of an armed conflict “in the [subsequent] context of an
armed conflict” is sufficient to satisfy the threshold element, but that is a
novel argument and there is no guarantee that such an argument would be
endorsed by judicial decision makers. It is true that international
jurisprudence on the scope of aiding and abetting as a mode of liability
envisages the sufficiency of ex ante acts of preparation. However, we are
unable to identify any extant international jurisprudence to substantiate the
proposition that acts of preparation to aid and abet a subsequent war crime
can occur prior to the commencement of an armed conflict.
There are other additional obstacles to weapons developer liability,
including the requisite mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting. A
weapon developer accused of aiding and abetting would typically render
41. We agree with the rejection of this approach by Anderson and Waxman. Kenneth
Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, 176 POLICY REVIEW
(Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/135336.
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their assistance prior to an armed conflict, whereas a criminal intent on the
part of the physical perpetrator would typically emerge during the conflict.
Bridging that temporal gap would require significant development of the
law beyond the current jurisprudence.
Even if each of these requisite elements could be established in respect
of a weapons developer, there is the further practical, perhaps practically
insurmountable, obstacle that to speak of “the developer” is to
misrepresent the realities of the development process. A sophisticated
autonomous weapons system will not be developed by a single individual,
but by many teams of developers in many organizations working on a
multitude of subsystems with complex interdependencies. Attempting to
identify an individual most responsible for subsequent behavior of a
deployed weapons system that constitutes a war crime may simply be too
difficult for the purposes of initiating trial proceedings. Each of these
obstacles compound the general concerns expressed by Alston as to the
inefficacy of existing accountability frameworks.
Those who favor a comprehensive multilateral treaty ban on
autonomous weapons systems may well break into applause at this point.
The identification of an accountability gap confirms the rationale for a
prohibition on the category of weapons before they are produced and
deployed in any larger numbers or, more importantly, in increasingly
sophisticated (and so increasingly legally significant) forms. Several
observations are relevant here.
The identification of obstacles to developer accountability in the
existing normative framework does not mean that updating, amendment,
revision and reform of the law is out of the question. The threshold
requirement that relevant acts occur “in the context of an armed conflict”
could be amended to explicitly (or could be interpreted to implicitly)
include acts of preparation prior to the commencement of the armed
conflict provided that the completion of the crime occurred in the relevant
context. Mens rea requirements for developers to aid and abet subsequent
offenses could also be clarified to cover the scenario we have been
considering.
There is much more to accountability than the individual criminal
liability of weapons developers. In situations of legally significant levels of
autonomy, the operator who deploys the weapons system may well be
excused of individual liability for lack of effective control over the behavior
of the weapons system. However, the commander who has called for the
deployment of the weapons system will be on notice once the system
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behaves in such a manner as to have resulted in a serious violation of the
law of armed conflict. At that point of the commander’s awareness, the
doctrine of command responsibility requires s/he take “all necessary and
reasonable measures” to prevent further crimes.42 Such measures may well
extend to ordering the standing down of the system pending reprogramming/adjustment/tweaking to prevent recurrent offenses. More
detailed analysis of the question of command responsibility in relation to
the deployment of autonomous weapons systems that result in the
perpetration of serious violations of the law of armed conflict is surely
warranted.
There is also much more to accountability than individual criminal
liability. Too little analysis has been undertaken on questions of State
responsibility for the deployment of autonomous weapons systems that
result in serious violations of the law of armed conflict. In particular,
national reviews of any proposed acquisition or modification of
autonomous weapons systems to ensure that the deployment of such
systems will only occur in compliance with the law of armed conflict
specifically, and international law obligations more generally, seem so much
more important for weapons systems over which operators exercise
relatively little, if any, effective control.43 States acquiring new—or
modifying existing—weapons systems may need to consider the imposition
of specific product liability requirements on developers, manufacturers and
vendors of such weapons systems to help cover reparation costs in the
event of violations of international legal obligations.

42. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 28(a)(ii).
43. As required by Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 36.
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